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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a new explanation for the relationship between firm scope, agent's effort and 
corporate risk. I set up a moral hazard in teams model with multiple agents and departments under 
the assumption that both the principal and the agents are protected by limited liability. Each agent 
exerts effort to reduce the probability of loss of his department. The two-sided limited liability 
assumption creates an externality between agents, since the bad performance of an agent could 
reduce the firm’s expected profit, and decrease the expected payoff of a good performing agent 
within the same firm. This would lower the incentive for other agents to exert effort, which causes 
'Contagious shirking'. I prove for the optimal contract and derive conditions for effort to increase 
or decrease with scope, and explain why ‘contagious effect’ could better answer this question than 
diversification when firm scope is large.   
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'Nothing can be so unjust as for a few persons abounding in wealth to offer a portion of their 
excess for the information of a company, to play with that excess, to lend the importance of their 
whole name and credit to the society, and then should the funds prove insufficient to answer all 
demands, to retire into the security of their unhazarded fortune, and leave the bait to be 
devoured by the poor deceived fish.' 
                                                 ---The Times of London, 1824.5.25 
 
1. Introduction 
We witnessed the fall of many large firms during the recent financial crisis. AIG was forced 
to accept nationalization due to mistakes in investment contracts although its insurance business 
was still promising. The case is also true for Lehman Brothers and many others, that the default in 
one or several of its many departments may trigger the fall of a large firm. The traditional view 
that a firm with large scope could lower its risk through diversification is being challenged by 
these new empirical facts. 
This paper provides a new explanation by using an agency approach to discuss the 
relationship between scope and risk. I set up a moral hazard in teams model with multiple projects 
and agents. The principal chooses the number of projects and hires one agent for each project. He 
then signs contracts with the agents. Each agent exerts unobservable effort in order to reduce the 
probability of loss in his project.  
The key assumption of our model is two-sided limited liability. Limited liability for the agent 
implies that punishments cannot go to extremes in designing contracts, creating an insufficient 
incentive problem. Limited liability for the principal brings externalities to agents’ performances, 
since the principal could default on wage payments when firm profit is low. So his ability to pay 
wages depends on the firm's profit which is affected by the agents’ efforts. An agent's payoff is 
then correlated with the other agents' efforts, and the shirking of one agent negatively affects the 
incentives of others within the same firm, leading to 'contagious shirking'. So, an agent’s incentive 
is not only affected by the principal's incentive scheme, but also by the efforts of other agents: the 
shirking of other agents would make the principal's wages less effective in providing incentives. 
I will prove that the contract we previously specified is the optimal one, and discuss the 
effect of firm expansion on agents' incentives, which is determined by the externality (either 
positive or negative) an additional agent creates on the pre-existing agents. When effort cost is 
high, an additional agent would exert less effort, and have a larger negative externality on the 
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whole team, which, in turn, makes the principal's wage less effective in providing incentives. The 
principal would then lower wage in the new contract which exacerbates the shirking problem. The 
magnitude of loss is another key determinant of the externality. So high effort cost and large losses 
would cause agent's effort to decline when the firm expands.  
    This paper mainly relates to three strands of literature: firm scope, moral hazard in teams and 
the discussions on distortions brought on by limited liability.  
    Originated from Coase (1937), followed by Alchian, Demsetz (1972), and Williamson (1985), 
the discussion of firm boundaries could be seen in the mass literature related to industrial 
organization and theory of the firm. These literature captured certain important features of a firm 
and set up relationships for agents within a firm to distinguish them from two agents working for 
different firms. The property rights view, for example, defined the firm as 'a collection of physical 
assets under common ownership' and analyzed the role of ownership in providing incentives for 
ex ante relationship-specific investments in a world of incomplete contracts (Grossman and Hart 
1986, Hart and Moore 1990). The agents in their model were interrelated by future transactions, 
whose gains depend on the two agents' ex-ante unverifiable relationship-specific investments.  
Other models and views regarding firm scope will be discussed in detail in section V. This 
model, different from previous ones, focuses on the two sided limited liability characteristic of a 
firm. Agents in the same firm are correlated by the financial situation of the firm, which is affected 
by the agents’ effort and will affect the expected payoff of every good performing agent. 
    The 'moral hazard in teams' problem was first addressed by Holmström (1982), who 
highlighted the free-riding and competition problems associated with a multi-agent setting. 
Extensions of this treatment include: a team of risk averse agents (Rasmusen 1987), reputation and 
relational concerns (Rayo 2007), two sided moral hazard problems (Najjar 1997) and so forth. 
In addition, many papers discussed the relationship between individual agent's effort and the 
number of agents (team size, span of control, firm scope, etc.). For example, in Aghion and 
Tirole's (1997) model, the principal and the agents exert effort to discover the payoffs of different 
possible actions. An increase in the number of agents would lower the principal's effort on every 
agent’s project, and lowers his probability to discover the payoffs of different alternatives, which 
means, an agent’s decision is less likely to be ruled out by the principal if he discovers his optimal 
choice. The agents would exert more effort as a response. If we change the relationship between 
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the agents' and the principal's effort from substitutes to complements, for example, the principal's 
effort is to monitor the agents, then an increase in firm scope would decrease agents' effort at the 
individual level (Qian 1994). 
Compared with previous literatures on moral hazard in teams, our model has the following 
differences: under the setting of indirect externalities and the assumption of unobservable effort, 
the principal's wage (incentive scheme) acts like a 'magnifier' to high effort cost when firm scope 
expands, which means, the changes in wage when firm scope expands would further cause agents' 
effort to decline. The relationship between the 'magnifier effect' and the 'contagious shirking 
effect' is: contagious shirking implies externalities, which is another determinant of agent's 
incentives besides wage. The negative externalities makes the principal's wage less effective in 
providing incentives for the agent, together with the trade off the principal faces (trade off 
between offering incentives and each successful project's profit), leads to this 'magnifier effect'. 
    Limited liability has long been a controversial topic in corporate law and governance. Despite 
its effect on mitigating the loss of investors, the investors could also default debt and wage 
payments in terms of bad states and leave the cost to the society (Halpern et. al. 1980). Firms with 
large risks would not fully consider the consequences of large losses and the goal of the principal 
is distracted from that of the social planner.  
Limited liability for the agent, which creates incentive distortions by prohibiting large 
penalties, has been discussed by a vast growing literature starting from Holmström (1979) and 
Lewis (1980). The design for correction mechanisms has also become a topic of interest. Laux 
(2001) set up an agency model with a single agent and multiple projects under the assumption that 
only the agent is protected by limited liability. One manager could carry out multiple projects in 
the Laux model so as to reduce the inefficiencies and distortions brought up by limited liability
2
. 
Biais et. al. (2010) introduced a dynamic model on firm size under a unilateral limited liability 
setting. In their model, the principal's commitment to invest and liquidate provides incentives to 
the agent by changing their continuation utility. The nature of effort is similar here to our model: 
to reduce the probability of large losses; but the settings are quite different. Ours is a multi-agent 
static model concerning firm scope, while the previous one is dynamic and includes only a single 
agent. 
                                                        
2 This is because by combining projects to a single manager could relax the limited liability constraint. 
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    The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the general structure 
of our model. Section 3 will provide the main theoretical results on the optimal contract and firm 
scope. We will make some extensions and provide our numerical results in section 4. Section 5 
will present some detailed discussions on the relationship between our paper and the existing 
literature on theory of firm scope. Section 6 will give out the conclusions. 
 
2. The Basic Model 
At time 0, the principal pays a registration fee F to set up a conglomerate. He could choose a 
number of projects to undertake from the set },{  ss
3
. Project could generate a 
verifiable monetary payoff (either positive or negative) at time 2, which is represented by a 
random variable X . The distribution is given by: 1X (with probability ); bX  (with 
probability 1 and 0b ). We will further assume that },{ X are i.i.d
4
. The principal 
then hires a project manager for each project and chooses a contract from a feasible set
5
.  
    I assume that both the agents and the principal are risk neutral and are protected by limited 
liability or bankruptcy law. The agent and the principal's initial wealth could be normalized to 0, 
two-sided limited liability implies that their ex post participation constraint must be satisfied
6
. 
The principal specifies a wage level w for every good performing agent ex ante. The firm's 
only asset at time 2 is the cash flows from the projects it undertakes, so its liquidation value equals 
to the net profit it generates from all of its projects. Since it is a static model, we assume that the 
firm perishes after time 2, so that the firm always fully liquidates its assets by that time. In case of 
liquidation the employee's wages have higher priority
7
 than the principal's return, so if the 
corporate value is larger than wN ( N is the number of projects undertaken which generates 
positive profits), each of the good performing agents would receive a wage w and the principal 
                                                        
3 In equilibrium, F should equal to the maximum profit a conglomerate could generate if the later is finite.  
4 The definition of independency of an infinite family of random variables could be seen in the 3rd chapter of <A 
Course in Probability>. (by Kai Lai Chung) 
5 Note that some of the variables are unverifiable or non-describable, and could not be specified in a formal 
contract. 
6
 We will further observe that in our model, changing the initial wealth level does not affect the main conclusions 
of our results. If the principal could choose to increase his commitment power by putting in more money ex ante as 
a collateral, the principal's optimal commitment level is below social first best, which implies he would not commit 
fully under every possible future contingency. 
7 According to the US Bankruptcy Law, Chapter 7. 
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claims the rest of the profits. If corporate profit is less than wN and larger than 0, each agent with 
good performance could only receive N/1 of the total profit, since the principal is protected by 
limited liability. If corporate profit is 0 or negative, both the agents and the principal's payoffs 
would be 0. 
Remember that the contract specified above is only one of implementable contracts. We will 
also discuss other forms of contracts in the next session, and see why contracts in this form is 
optimal. The proof in section 3 will show that any contract which implements the same level of 
effort and satisfies the principal's commitment constraint are equivalent.  
At time 1, each agent could exert a non-observable effort (for agent i , the effort level is 
denoted by ia ) to lower the probability of large loss of his project, where ii a , ]1,0[a
8
.  
Effort is costly for the agent with the cost function )(ag . g is assumed to be continuous and third 
order differentiable, with ,0)(' ag ,0)(" ag    )(lim,0)(lim
'
1
'
0
agag
aa
.
9
  
Also, define the baseline effort level as: }0)()(,10sup{ "'0  agagaaa , an effort 
level below 0a will not incur any cost for the agent. We will now show respectively for different 
values of the large loss level b , the relationship between corporate scope, optimal wage levels, 
agents' effort and individual project risk. Under the contractual form we specified above, the 
agent's payoff could be expressed as: 
}
}0{)0{
,min{ 11
N
XXX
wEEp
n
i
i
n
i
ij
j





    (  is the indicator function) 
    The agent's problem is to choose the effort level to maximize his expected payoff. The 
principal would choose the wage level to maximize his expected payoff given the agent's response 
function. We could express them respectively as: 
)(maxmax
1
i
n
i
iwnw pXEEP  

     
Subject to: )(max jja agEpj       
                                                        
8 The nature of effort here is 'selfish'. 
9 This form of effort cost function is also adopted by Aghion and Tirole (1997), Hiriart and Martimort (2006),etc. 
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    We will first consider the case when 1b and the number of projects is even )2( kn  and 
later show the relationship between kn 2 and 12  kn . Let }
2
22
,min{
ik
ik
wri


 , for 
1,...,1,0  ki . For any positive integer k , the agent's expected payoff function could be 
expressed as: (exposing the symmetric condition for agents other than j ) 
)())1(( 12
1
0
12 j
iik
k
i
i
i
kjj agaarCaEp 



            --- (1) 
The FOC and the symmetric condition together imply: 
iik
k
i
i
i
k
k aarCwaag )1()( 12
1
1
12
12'  



               --- (2) 
which is equivalent to: 
))()1((
1 '12
1
1
1212
agaarC
a
w iik
k
i
i
i
kk
 


            --- (2') 
The principal's payoff function could be written as: 
])1(2[)1(...])12()22)[(1()1(2 1
111
21
121
2
2
2 
  k
kkk
k
k
k
k
k rkaaCrkkaaCwkaEP
                                                    --- (3') 
Substituting w with (2'), by simple algebra and equivalent transformations, we could obtain the 
reduced form: 
)(2)1()22( '
1
0
2
22 akagaaCikEP
k
i
iiki
kk 



          --- (3) 
Take the FOC with respect to agent's effort level we can get: 
FOC:
11
2
221
2
122 )1()1(...)1()12)(1(20   kkkk
k
k
k aakCaaCkkak  
                )()()1()1(...)1( "'2112
121
2 akagakgaakCaCk
kkk
k
k
k 

 
The reduced form could be written as: 
)()( 2 aRaL k                                       --- (4) 
(
2
)()(
)(
"' aagag
aL

  , 


 
k
i
iiki
kk aaCaR
1
121
122 )1()( ) 
Define a family of i.i.d. random variables }12,...2,1,{  kiYi , 1iY (with probability a ); 
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0iY (with probability a1 ).  
Denote 


n
i
in YS
1
, then )
2
1
12
()()( 12122 

 
k
S
PkSPaR kkk .  
SOC: 0
2
)()(2
)1(
"'"
11
12 

 
aagag
aakC kkkk , which is satisfied for the greatest solution 
of the FOC
10
.  
    Extending our discussion to any positive integer 1n , the optimal effort level satisfies: 






 




]
2
[
1
11
1
]
2
[1]
2
[]
2
[
1
1 )1()1(
2
]
2
[2
)
2
1
1
()(
n
i
iini
n
nn
n
n
n
n aaCaaC
n
n
n
S
PaL 11 
    Since
2
]
2
[2
n
n 
equals to 0 when n is even and
2
1
when n is odd, so it is consistent with the 
previous results. When 1n , the agent's effort level satisfies: wag )(' , the principal's payoff 
is ))(1()1( ' agawa  , which is a degeneration form of the above expressions.   
    Multiplicity exists for a large n since the corresponding relationship between effort level and 
wage is not monotonic when n is large enough, we may witness multiple equilibriums under a 
given wage. We will make the artificial refinement by making the assumption that if multiple 
symmetric Nash Equilibriums exist for a given wage level, the equilibrium with the highest effort 
level is always reached. This refinement would guarantee effort to be strictly increasing with wage, 
but there are finite numbers of jumps if we plot a against w , a is not a continuous function of w . 
Under this refinement, we could prove the following lemmas. 
Lemma 1: Take the partial derivatives to the principal's payoff function with respect to a is 
equivalent to the principal's FOC with respect to w . Under the largest solution of (4), the 
principal's expected payoff is globally maximized. 
Proof: See appendix   
Lemma 2: FOC, optimal effort level, optimal wage is the same for kn 2 and 12  kn ; 
)12/(2/ 122  kkEPEP kk . 
                                                        
10 We will later see that this is the equilibrium reached after our refinement. 
11 [x] denotes the greatest integer no larger than x. 
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Proof: See appendix   
    We will next loose the assumption 1b and find the function for the optimal effort for every 
scope n with a given integer )0(b .  
Lemma 3: The interim individual rationality constraint of the agent is always satisfied under our 
given contract. 
Proof: See appendix                   
Proposition 1: If the firm operates in n projects, the optimal effort then satisfies: 
  









 



 ]1[
1
11
1
]
1
[1]
1
[]
1
[
1 )1()1(
1
)1](
1
[ b
n
i
iini
n
b
n
b
n
n
b
n
n aaCaaC
b
b
b
n
n
         
1
)()(
)
11
(
"'
1






 
b
aagag
b
b
n
S
P n                                          --- (5) 
Denote solution for the above equation to be )(na , the principal's payoff function is: 




 
]
1
1
[
0
)(
'
)()()( )()1(])1([
b
n
i
nn
i
n
in
n
i
nn agnaaaCibnEP                           --- (6) 



n
i
in YS
1
, where }1,{ nYn is a set of independent and identically distributed random variables 
with distribution: 1nY with probability a ; 0nY with probability a1 . 
Proof: See appendix    
3. Optimal Contract and Firm Scope 
3.1 Optimal Contracts 
    We will prove that the contract we specified above is the optimal one, and a change in 
contractual form could not increase the principal's payoff. Since individual department's profit is 
the only relevant variable which is verifiable, the principal could write a contract which makes 
wage contingent on the performance of the n agents.  
    In general, a contract with n agents is in the form of: nRg : , where is the set of all 
possible state of the world at time 1. Each possible state is given by the value of the n random 
variables, namely  )...,( 21 nXXXX . )...,( 21 ngggg  is the payoff of respective agents. 
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The principal's limited liability brings the constraint at a given state is: 


n
i
i
n
i
i XXg
11
)( ; agent 
i's limited liability constraint could be written as 0)( Xgi . We will solve for the optimal 
contract in a symmetric setting, which means, all the agents with the same observable result gets 
the same expected payoff.  
    A contract which provides incentives for the agent to invest would maximize the gap between 
an agent with good result and one with bad result, given that the agents are risk neutral. So, the 
manager gets paid a wage 0)()(  RwXgi if and only if 1iX and 0
1


n
i
iX  The wage in 
this case satisfies: RRNw )( , where }1:{#  iXiN . 
    We suppose the initial contract specifies a manager with positive profit could obtain a 
wage ir if i of the total n departments are running deficits ])
2
[0(
n
i  . ininri 2)(  must be 
satisfied to make the principal's ex ante commitment credible because of the limited liability 
constraint. We could derive the following conditions under a refined symmetric Nash Equilibrium 
with n agents: 
FOC for the agent: 
)())1((0 '1
]
2
1
[
0
1 agaarC
iin
n
i
i
i
n 



  
Payoff for the principal: 
)()1()2( '
]
2
1
[
0
anagaaCinEP
n
i
iini
nn  



 
which we could generalize that it is irrelevant to ir . FOC for the principal:  






 




]
2
[
1
11
1
]
2
[1]
2
[]
2
[
1
1 )1()1(
2
]
2
[2
)
2
1
1
()(
n
i
iini
n
nn
n
n
n
n aaCaaC
n
n
n
S
PaL  
SOC for both is satisfied if we plug in the FOC. From these results, we could generalize the 
proposition below: 
Proposition 2: All contracts which satisfies: 
1) An agent with bad performance never get paid; 
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2) ininri 2)(   for every integer no greater than n ; 
3) Effort level a for every agent is implementable. 
must achieve the same payoff, which satisfies:  
)()1()2( '
]
2
1
[
0
anagaaCinEP
n
i
iini
nn  



 
The optimal contract is the a which maximizes nEP . 
Proof: See above illustrations 
    The contract we discussed in session 2 satisfies the above conditions, since 
}
}0{)0{
,min{)( 11
N
XXX
wXp
n
i
i
n
i
ij
j





, where w is a prior specified wage level and 
jp is the payment to agent j ( )ˆ(aww  , where )(maxargˆ aEPa n ). We will use this form of 
contract in the following discussions, while w is the wage level when all projects are running 
positive profit.  
3.2 Firm Scope  
    In this sub-session, we will again assume 1b and examine the relationship between firm 
scope and agent's effort cost function, which could be extended to other values of b . We will give 
out and prove for some sufficient conditions for effort to increase/decrease with scope. We will 
present numerical findings in later sections. Proposition 3 gives out a sufficient condition for effort 
to decrease with scope, when effort cost is high. 
Proposition 3: If 2)()( "'  aagag has a solution smaller than 0.5, which means effort cost is 
very high, then effort level would converge to the baseline level 0a when n goes to infinity. (We 
will denote the solution of 2)()( "'  aagag by *a ) 
Proof: See appendix  
     The intuitions of the assumptions are as follows. The solution of 2)()( "'  aagag is 
small together with the monotonic increasing characteristic of the LHS imply that the cost of 
effort is increasing rapidly. In this case, the agent's effort level would strictly decrease with scope 
due to externalities despite the adjustment of wage by the principal. Wage could either increase or 
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decrease. An intuitive result is that wages would tend to rise when effort cost is low, and would 
tend to decline when effort cost is high. The logic is that the principal faces a trade-off between 
the payoff in each successful project (depends negatively on wage) and the probability of success. 
We could generalize that wages would tend to increase if the agent is more responsive (effort cost 
is low) or the value of b is larger.  
    We will then examine the case when 5.0* a , which means, effort cost is lower. Proposition 
4 will give out a sufficient condition for effort to be increase with scope. The conditions are: 
Condition 1: For every positive integer k , there always exists an interval )1,0(),( kk cb , such 
that: 
),(0
2
)()(2
)1(
"'"
11
12 kk
kkk
k cba
aagag
aakC 

   
Condition 2: 0))()((lim 20  aRaL ka  
Proposition 4: If 5.0)1( a and condition 1 and 2 hold, effort is increasing with firm scope when 
the firm's expected profit is positive. }{ )(na is an increasing sequence for odd integer n which 
satisfies: 0)( )( nn aEP . 
Proof: See appendix   
Note that 0)( )( nn aEP must be satisfied, when we plot nEP against a , there are two or more 
local maximum point when n is large, one with a high effort level the other with an extremely low 
effort level
12
. The high effort level could not be achieved unless nEP for the high effort level is 
above the low one. 0)( )( nn aEP since nEP low is approximately 0. 
 
4. Extensions and Numerical Findings 
4.1 Benchmark: Social Optimal Scope and Wage  
    We will next consider the social optimal case where the firm scope and wage are both chosen 
by a social planner when both the agent and the conglomerate are protected by limited liability. 
The social optimal effort level satisfies: 
                                                        
12 See numerical findings on under-scope. 
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)()1)((max 10 agabaa                                     --- (7) 
FOC: 11)('  bag  
Denote the solution to the FOC to be a . 
SOC: 0)("  ag  
Lemma 4: The effort implemented under any feasible contract is less than the social optimal level. 
The social planner's objective function is strictly increasing with effort when aa   . The social 
optimal scope is the n inducing the highest effort level when 1w . 
Proof: See appendix  
    From the discussion of the optimal contract in the previous section, we could generalize the 
following result: 
Lemma 5: If 0a , 01  nEPw under the optimal contract. 
Proof: See appendix 
    Denote the maximum solution for 0nEP by
*
na , the social optimal n satisfies: 
*maxarg nan    
Proposition 5: The social first best choice of scope and wage is 1w and 1n , which is 
independent of the effort cost function.   
Proof: See appendix  
4.2 Numerical Results on Principal's Optimal Scope 
    We will then list out several numerical findings based on specific function forms of g in this 
sub-session and also provide several unproved conjectures. We will focus on two functional forms 
1) )1ln()( aag    
    From the FOC, 1)1(
)1( 1
121
122






k
i
iiki
k aaC
a

,  has to be small enough to ensure 
positive profit for the firm. It is easy to prove that 1 . For certain values of  , effort level 
could suddenly drop to 0 at some critical point of n . For this cost function, the SOC could be 
written as:  
21
12 )1(
kkk
k aakC , the LHS reaches its maximum at
12
1



k
k
a , which means 
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condition 1 is satisfied. The same is true for condition 2 if we allow
0a in the FOC. So, the 
results and corollaries in proposition 5 holds.  
A. Social Optimal Scope=Principal Optimal Scope=1 
3.0 . 452.0)1( a , 0)( na for 1n . Social optimal scope=principal optimal scope=1. 
B. Under-Scope 
2.0 , 612.0)5()3()1(  aaa , 0)( na for 5n . The principal's payoff reaches its 
maximum when 1n , 3056.01 EP . The principal's optimal scope is less than social optimal 
scope.  
C. Non-Converging 
16.0 , )(na is strictly non-decreasing with respect to n , and would approach its ceiling 
when n goes to infinity. The principal's payoff is also increasing with scope. Over-scope could not 
exist under this functional form. Based on simple calculations, we could reach the conclusion 
that: 5.00 )1()3(  aa , which means, over-scope is impossible.    
2)  }
1
1
exp{)('
aa
ag

 

  
    This cost function violates condition 1 and 2. In this case, there always exists a positive value 
of effort level a to generate the principal positive profits. However, there could still be a sharp 
decline in effort level due to multiplicity problems, which means, the effort level for the principal's 
payoff to reach its maximum may not be unique, especially when n is large. 
A. Over-Scope 
    1,7.1   , 459.05.05202.0 )1(
*  aa . The agent's effort level is strictly 
decreasing with scope. Social optimal scope equals to 1 where a reaches its maximum value. The 
principal's optimal scope equals to 3, where there is an over-scope problem. 
B. Under-Scope 
    1,2   , 5.05043.05568.0 )1(
*  aa . The agent's effort level is strictly 
increasing until 35n after which we will witness a sharp decline. Social optimal scope equals to 
35 where a reaches its maximum value 0.5138. The principal's optimal scope equals to 9, where 
there is an under-scope problem. 
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C. Non-Converging 
    1,3   , 5.05642.06112.0 )1(
*  aa . The agent's effort level and the 
principal's payoff are both strictly increasing with n , which means, the social optimal scope and 
the principal optimal scope would be where n approaches infinity. 
D. Social Optimal Scope=Principal Optimal Scope=1 
    1,5.1   , 427.04907.05.0 )1(
*  aa . The agent's effort level and the 
principal's payoff are both strictly decreasing with n , which means, the social optimal scope and 
the principal optimal scope both equal to 1.                                                 
    So the results from our numerical observations are: 
1) If for any integer n , there always exist a feasible effort (the wage corresponding at that scope is 
no greater than 1) 5.0a , then effort level would be strictly increasing with scope and would be 
approaching its upper bound
*a . nEP is also non-declining with scope. This is corresponding to 
the non-convergence case. 
2) If 5.0)1( a , but there exists an integer m such that 5.0)( ma ( m is the smallest among those 
integers), then the principal's optimal scope no greater than 2m and social optimal scope 
is 1m or 2m . nEP will first increase and then decrease with scope. This is corresponding to 
the under-scope case. 
3) If 5.0* a , 5.0)1( a , effort level would be non-increasing with scope. nEP will first increase 
and then decrease with scope, which means, the principal's optimal scope is greater than social 
optimal scope 1. This is corresponding to the over-scope case. 
4) If 5.0* a , 5.0)1( a , effort level would be non-increasing with scope. nEP would be 
declining when n is odd. The principal optimal scope also equals to 1. 
 
4.3 Wage 
Throughout this section, we will be focusing on the case when 1b under the contract we 
specified in session 2. We will refer "feasible effort level under scope n " to the set of values 
of a which satisfies 0nEP . The following corollaries about feasible effort are deduced from 
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proposition 2: 
Corollary 1: )1,0()(0)(  awaEP nn   
Corollary 2: For every )1,0(a , there exists a unique w (not necessarily smaller than 1), such 
that the equation below holds: 
0)1()( 1
]
2
1
[
0
1
'  


 iin
n
i
i
i
n aarCag                                 --- (9) 
    We will refer a wage w implements effort level a if (9) holds. Since only an implicit 
relationship between a and w is available, we will first give out results about wage in the 
under-scope case with simple functional form: )1ln()( aag   and then list out several 
numerical findings about the relationship between wage and scope in the over-scope case with 
more complex functional form: }
1
1
exp{)('
aa
ag

 

 . 
4.3.1 Under-scope: )1ln()( aag    
    In this section, we will first assume that the optimal scope for the principal and for the society 
are both finite and n is odd. Denote the principal's optimal scope to be *n and social optimal scope 
to be
**n . From the definition of under-scope, we have the relations below: 
)()( *** nn
aa     *** nn EPEP    
*** nn   
Lemma 6: A necessary condition for under-scope is there exists 1n such that: 
2
1
4
1
00max )1()1,0(  aEPna  . 
Proof: See appendix  
Proposition 6: Under the conditions of lemma 6, )()( )1(1)3(3 awaw  . Generally, the optimal w  
is increasing with scope for any odd integer n satisfying: 0max )1,0(  na EP . 
Proof: See appendix  
    So far, we have proved that for the simple functional form: )1ln()( aag   , wage is 
increasing with scope (for those n which satisfy 0max )1,0(  na EP ) in case of under-scope. 
 17 
4.3.2 Over-scope: }
1
1
exp{)('
aa
ag

 

  
Example: (over-scope) 1,7.1   . Remember that effort level is non-increasing with scope. 
558.0)( )1(1 aw , 533.0)( )3(3 aw . The wage under social optimal scope is larger than 
principal optimal scope.  
    The morals we could address from the example above is that in case of over-scope, wages are 
declining with scope. 
4.3.3 Optimal Wage as 'Magnifier' 
    Based on previous findings, we could generalize: wages would tend to increase with scope if 
effort cost is low, but decrease if effort cost is high. So, when effort cost is high for the agents, the 
principal's under-provision of incentives would further decrease the effort exerted by the agents. 
So we conclude that the principal's incentive scheme acts like a 'magnifier' when firm scope 
increases.  
The intuition for this magnifier effect is: the agent is also affected by the performance of 
others within the organization besides the principal's wage. When effort cost is high, an additional 
agent would have more negative externality on the existing team, together, with the original effect 
of high effort cost, would make the principal's high wage less effective. The principal, facing a 
tradeoff between high effort (which requires high wages) and high profit from every successful 
project, would tend to pay a lower wage when the firm expands. This would exacerbate the 
insufficient incentive problem, which would lead to a further decline in effort.  
4.3.4 Scope Selection Under a Fixed Wage 
    In this section, we will take wage as exogenously given and compare the principal's optimal 
scope with the social optimal one. Our analysis could also provide further insight into the 
magnifier effect of wage. Since an under-investment is commonly faced by agents in our model, 
we will assume that 15.0  w . We will compare the individual effort level and the principal's 
payoff when 1n and 3n with effort cost function to be )1ln()( aag   , thus addressing 
the over-scope problem when letting the principal choose his optimal scope when we fix the wage. 
To make our discussion well-defined, we will assume that )25.0,0( , otherwise, principal 
would never generate positive profit when 3n . The following expressions could be derived 
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from our basic model. When 1n : 
w
a

1                      --- (11) 
)1)(1()(1
w
wwEP

          --- (12) 
When 3n , 15.0  w : 
22 )1()1( aaawa         --- (13) 
)1(3)( 33 wawEP              --- (14) 
Proposition 7: The social optimal scope under a fixed wage is always 1n . ( 31 aa  ) 
Proof: See appendix  
    We will next focus on the existence of  and w for )()( 13 wEPwEP  , which from (12) and 
(14), is equivalent to: 
w
a

13 3 . By plugging in (13) we could get the equivalent expression: 
23
2
21
)1(
aa
w
aa


.     --- (15) 
When 1w , which means the wage is large enough, we could get the approximation: 
013 23  aaa          --- (16) 
    Expression (16) could be satisfied when 1a , (13) implies that for every 1a , there exists 
a value of  , such that a is implementable under a wage approximate to but less than 1. From the 
above discussions, we could have the following proposition: 
Proposition 8: When wages are fixed to be high enough and effort cost is low, the principal's 
optimal scope is larger than social optimal one, which indicates an over-scope problem. 
Proof: See above illustrations.  
Comparing the results of proposition 7 and 8 with proposition 6, we could clearly generalize: 
when effort cost is low, the principal's optimal wage serves as a magnifier to further promote 
effort. The underlying logic is: if the wage is fixed, then effort level should decline; but we witness 
an increase in effort by individual agent if we let the principal choose his optimal wage. The 
increase in effort is clearly spurred by the increase in wage.  
4.4 Extreme Risk 
    In this sub-session, we will consider the case of extreme risks. We will assume that 1b , 
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so that the default in anyone of the projects would wipe out the profit of the whole firm. We will 
first fix the corporate scope to be n . The principal and the agents have positive payoffs if and only 
if all the projects generate positive profits, and furthermore, all the agents will either get fully paid 
or get no payment at all. The principal's expected payoff given the agents' effort level and the 
wage level is: 



n
i
in awnEP
1
)1(  
    Agent j's problem is to choose his effort level to maximize his expected payoff : 
)()(max
1
10 j
n
i
ijja agawaEpj  

  
    Take the first order conditions (FOC) with respect to agent j's effort level: 
0)(
1 '
1


j
n
i
i
j
agaw
a
 
The second order condition (SOC) is trivially satisfied since 0)(" ag . Imposing the 
symmetric conditions, we will get:
1' )(  nwaag , where a stands for individual agent's effort 
level. The principal's maximization problem under a certain scope: 
)1(maxmax wnaEP nwnw  . 
    Since w is a continuous function of a , nEP is 0 when
 0a and goes to  when 1a , 
the point where nEP achieving the maximum value satisfies: 0/  aEPn . So the maximum 
profit could be written as: )1(max wnanAa  , }0/{  aEPaA n . a will not lie in the 
'jumped areas', since a contradiction exists if we compare it with the nEP at the same wage level 
with a higher effort. The above argument ensures that to take the FOC against a is rigorous. 
FOC: 0)())(1( '12  afnaafan n
n
n
n  0)())(1( '  aafafn nn  
which is also equivalent to: 
)()( '"1 agaagnan       --- (17)                        
SOC: 02)1()1( "'12   n
n
n
n
n
n fafnafann   
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which is equivalent to: 
2""' )1()(2)(  nannagaag , which is trivially satisfied if we plug 
in the FOC. We will next show that the above FOC is consistent with the results derived in section 
1. For a fixed scope n , 1 nb is equivalent to 1 nb under limited liability, since the 
expected profit is the probability of all projects generating positive profits multiplies the number 
of projects; the loss in one project would wipe out all corporate profit. We have the expression 
below: 
)1()
1
11
())()((
1
1
11'" 





 
 nSP
n
n
b
b
n
S
Paagaag
n
n
nn   --- (18)       
which is equivalent to the FOC when 1 nb .  
 
5. More Discussions on Theory of the Firm 
    We will make our start by listing out several common features firms share, we will proceed 
by posing several questions correlated with these features: What is a firm? What determines its 
boundaries? How could agents within the same firm correlate with one another? How is this 
relation different from two agents belong to different firms? We will list out the answers to these 
questions based on previous literature as well as our model. By comparison, we could summarize 
our paper's contribution to the theory of the firm. 
    In the standard property right view, the firm could be seen as a collection of physical assets 
under common ownership, whereas the owner is endowed with both the decision authority and the 
rent over the assets he owned
13
. Different sectors of a firm interact mainly through transactions 
and other cooperative activities, such as the case of GM and Fisher Body (see Hart 1995). 
Externalities exist when the parties could improve the trading gain through ex ante 
relationship-specific investments
14
. Contractual problems arise when ex ante investment could not 
be verified, even though they are mutually observable. Firm boundaries would affect the decision 
authorities, hence the relative positions in ex post bargaining, and is determined by the 
complementarities and substitutability of physical assets, or more generally, the contribution of 
assets to a coalition (see Hart Moore 1990, Hart 1995)
15
.  
                                                        
13 See Hart Moore (1990). The owner of the asset could enjoy larger share of the surplus. 
14 We usually refer to indirect externalities, for example, the buyer's investment would only increase his value, the 
seller's investment would only reduce its cost. For discussions on direct externalities, see Che and Hausch (1999).  
15 This could be extended to human capital, as in Rajan and Zingales (1998), the worker, who is given access, 
could make himself valuable by specialization investment, and he could have bargaining power based on his 
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Different from the Grossman-Hart-Moore paradigm, Hart and Holmstrǒm (2010) stressed the 
role of decision authority in handling disputes within a firm. The firm is different from market 
from its emphasis on authority. Different agents and departments are related through cooperation 
and coordination. There are conflicts between the gains from coordination and individual agent's 
private benefit, and integration would lead to too much coordination since the principal would put 
insufficient weight on the agents' private benefits. Firm boundaries are determined by the relative 
gains and losses from coordination and the weight which the principal places on agents' private 
benefits (determined by the dead-weight losses caused by shading).  
Our paper views the firm as a legal person, who is protected by limited liability and has 
limited commitment over future payments. The agents within a firm relate to each other through 
indirect externalities, which is created by limited liability of the principal. Under the optimal 
contract, a well-performed agent would be paid a pre-specified wage if the firm's financial status 
permits such a payment; or receive the firm's value divided by the number of departments which 
performs well; or otherwise, if the firm's overall profit is non-positive, then he will not receive any 
payment. Therefore, the other agents' efforts could increase the marginal return of effort of an 
individual agent, and therefore, provide more incentive for him to work hard. Also, the shirking of 
one agent not only decreases the probability of success of his own department, but also decreases 
the incentives of other agents and discourages them to exert effort. The shirking of other agents 
could then have a negative feedback on that agent's incentive and further decrease his effort level. 
We call this 'contagious shirking' .  
    This would provide an explanation for cultures in firms and other organizations, where the 
members' behaviors follow a certain norm, either do they work hard together or shirk together. 
Fischer and Huddart's (2008) model illustrated the importance of social norms in determining the 
optimal incentive scheme and the agent's behavior within an organization. In their model, they 
assumed that the agent's behavior cost is increasing with the level of adherence of his behaviour to 
social norm (average behavior). But their model does not explain why social norm exists. In our 
model, this sort of linkage of agents is brought up by limited financial liability of a firm, which is 
the key assumption in our model. In our selections of symmetric Nash Equilibriums, we also 
provide a rational which is consistent with the field experimental results of Uri Gneezy and Aldo 
                                                                                                                                                              
specialized human capital. 
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Rustichini (2000) which higher financial incentives do not necessarily lead to the more desirable 
actions. 
The relationship between scope and effort is determined by the cost of effort and magnitude 
of losses. Rather than explain the question with 'diversification', we argue that the contagious 
effect (the externality of an additional agent) is the key determinant, which we have shown is more 
appropriate. Positive externalities imply 'contagious working' and negative ones imply 'contagious 
shirking'. If effort cost is high and the magnitude of losses are large, the second effect would cause 
effort to decrease when firm scope expands. If effort cost is low or the magnitude of losses are 
small, the first effect would cause effort to increase with scope. 
Furthermore, it could even invalidates the principal's incentive schemes, since the expected 
marginal return to hard work is reduced. So the model also provides an explanation for why firms 
which requires costly unobservable effort are proned to choose a narrow scope. Our model also 
has some welfare and regulation implications on the regulation of managerial wages and firm 
scope. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Our model provides an explanation for the relationship between firm scope and corporate risk, 
especially for those phenomena that diversification could not explain. Our model coincides with 
some observations in the recent crisis, where a large firm went bankrupt because of the loss of one 
or several of its many departments.   
The main difference of our setup with previous ones is the two sided limited liability 
assumption, especially, limited liability for the principal, which implies limited commitment 
ability on wage payments. The agent's incentive distortion brought up by limited liability leads 
him to shirk, and this deteriorates the other agents' incentives by lowering the expected profit of 
the firm, and hence the principal's ability to pay wages. This is because a good performing agent 
could not be well compensated if the whole firm is running a deficit. A vivid expression for this is 
'contagious shirking', which is commonly observed in nowaday firms and organizations.  
In our model, we proved that the equivalence between contracts which could implement the 
same effort level and satisfies the principal's commitment constraint on every contingency and 
also 0 payment to bad performing agents.  
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Under the optimal contract, whether the agent's effort is increasing or decreasing when the 
firm expands depends on the cost of effort and magnitude of losses. If effort cost is high, an 
additional agent would exert less effort, and have larger negative externality on the whole team, 
which makes the principal's wage less effective in providing incentives. The principal would lower 
wage in the new contract which exacerbates the shirking problem. So high effort cost would cause 
agent's effort to decline when the firm expands. Moreover, the magnitude of negative externalities 
also depend on the magnitude of losses, larger potential losses could further decrease effort in a 
large team where contagious shirking effect dominates. 
Other conclusions include the social first best wage and scope; welfare implications on firm 
scope; how effective are the regulations on wage and scope; how to explain corporate cultures, 
and so forth. 
    A flaw of our model is that agents would always tend to exert less effort compared with 
social first best, so the social optimal scope is which induces the manager to exert the highest 
effort under the principal's optimal contract. In real world observations, there are cases when 
agents exert inefficient high efforts, and a social planner's goal in that case is to prevent 
managerial overloading brought up by expansion
16
. Another incomplete part of this paper is that it 
fails to give out the equivalent conditions of effort's increase (or decrease) when firm scope 
expands, but only gives out some sufficient conditions and numerical examples. 
    Another criticism might be that the principal could increase his commitment ability by 
throwing in more money initially and to provide a safe back for the agents. We confess that the 
optimal initial commitment level is not necessarily 0. But it is easy to prove that the optimal level 
is below )1( nb , which indicates the principal would not fully commit to wage payment under 
every circumstance. This partial commitment is consistent with real world observations and 
therefore, the contagious effect still exists in an organization with two-sided limited liability.
17
    
Besides, this model is just a preliminary step on how a firm's financial situation would affect 
its internal structure, level of riskiness and the agent's incentives. I will make several proposals for 
further research in this area. 
                                                        
16 Laux (2001) provides a model to explain this observation by assuming different projects under the control of a 
single manager.  
17 See Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull (1980). 
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First, we need to extend this static model to a dynamic one to study the more general case of 
a multiple agent setting where both the principal and the agents are protected by limited liability. 
The principal has more tools to provide incentives, the one agent with various project size case 
could be seen in Biais et al (2010), in their model, the principal could liquidate part of the asset as 
a punishment for large losses, and invest when observing good performance. The difference is that 
we should include multiple agents and assuming the principal is also protected by limited liability. 
The fixed project size assumption is also restrictive, since in reality the principal could manipulate 
on project size based on historical performance to provide incentives for the agents.  
Secondly, individual department's performance is perfectly verifiable is also a restrictive 
assumption
18
. For example, if the profit of each department is observable for the principal but not 
observable for the agents (except for the one who is controlling the project), the agents’ decision is 
affected by the principal’s financial report. The principal could choose to fire the agent with bad 
performance (which is publically observable) or retain his position in order to hide current losses 
and cheat the other agents. He may have incentives to cheat in a dynamic model, since the 
seemingly good financial status may provide better incentives for the agents. This would lead to 
communication failure (the agents do not trust the financial report of the firm) and less incentive 
to exert effort in equilibrium. The wage’s repayment path is also critical in this model: it could 
neither be too quick (the principal would run out of cash) nor too slow (contagious effect would 
lower incentives to exert effort). Solving for the optimal contract in the dynamic model and also 
the equilibriums in the cheat talk game as well as the optimal repayment path is left to future 
research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
18 The author is grateful to Yuliy Sannikov for this suggestion. 
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Appendix 
Proof of lemma 1: 
From (3), we could generalize that since 02 kEP when
0a and kEP2  when
1a , 
and
kEP2 is a continuous function of a , the effort level which maximized the principal's payoff 
must satisfy: 0/2  aEP k . If a could not correspond to any wage level after the refinement, 
then, there must be another aa ' corresponding to the same wage, which from the expression 
of
kEP2 , strictly dominates a . So after the refinement process, the problem is well-defined.                                                               
                                                                         Q.E.D. 
Proof of lemma 2:  The conclusion is equivalent to the reduced form: 
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)1( , which could be proven as 
trivially satisfied.                                                           Q.E.D. 
Proof of lemma 3: Since the agent's payoff when effort level is 0 is 0. According to lemma 1, 
there exists a value a  which satisfies the FOC and at which point, the agent's payoff is globally 
maximized. So the agent's expected payoff at that point must be greater than 0.          Q.E.D.  
Proof of proposition 3: Denote the effort level corresponding to the principal's optimal contract 
under given scope n is )(na . Since 1)( )2( kaL for any k , so 2/1)2( ka for any k , and there 
exists 2/10  s , such that 1)( sL . From the Chebyshev Inequality: 
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when k goes to infinity.  
So the effort level converges to the baseline level 0a .                               Q.E.D. 
Proof of proposition 4: 12  kn .  
Condition 1 guarantees there are only two possible circumstances for the extremes of nEP . 
If a satisfies FOC and ),( kk cba , then )(aEPn is a minimum value; otherwise ( ),( kk cba ), it 
is a maximum value. For a third order differentiable function, its maximum value must stay 
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between two minimum values, the inverse is also true. The only two possible circumstances are: 
1) FOC has only one solution )(na , where nEP reaches its maximum. 
2) FOC has two solutions, the larger one is where nEP reaches its maximum and the smaller one is 
where nEP reaches its minimum. 
According to the central limit theorem, )
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5.0a . We could then finish our proof using the recursive technique. If 5.0)( na , since: 
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)()()( )(22)(2)( nknkn aRaRaL  . A maximum value of nEP must be achieved to the right 
of )(na . From the uniqueness of the maximum value according to our previous discussions, 
)()2( nn aa  .  
From lemma 2, )2()1(   nn aa . Since 5.0)1( a , then }{ )(na so long as 0)( )( nn aEP .   Q.E.D. 
Proof of lemma 4: From equation (2) in a general setting, we could generalize the inequality 
below for b equals to any positive value: 
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From 0)(
" ag , we could generalize that aa  . 0)(1 '  agb . From the monotonic 
relationship between wage and effort after the refinement, we could generalize that social optimal 
wage equals to 1 when it is chosen by a social planner.                             Q.E.D. 
Proof of proposition 5: From the results generated from section 1, 1)( 1
' ag . 1)(' nag for 
any positive integer n greater than 1. So, the highest effort level is achieved 
when 1n and 1w .                                                       Q.E.D. 
Proof of lemma 6: We will prove: 
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which is equivalent to :
4
1
)1(2 2)3()3(  aa according to monotonic relations.  
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)( na . (Note that this relation holds only for specific function forms) 
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a . No effort level is feasible. 0max )1,0(  na EP for 
any 1n .                                                                 Q.E.D. 
Proof of proposition 6: We will only give out the proof for former part. Denote
nw in short 
of )( )(nn aw . 
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the inequality is equivalent to
2
)3()3( )2(2 aa  , which never holds for 1
3
2
 a , contradiction. 
So 13 ww  .                                                              Q.E.D. 
Proof of proposition 7: From (11) and (13): 
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